Assad’s Prison State
Much of the media is reporting the collapse of the Assad regime as ‘scary jihadis’ rather than as the liberation – the huge advance in human freedom – it actually is. I’ve written this text for the ISIS Prisons Museum (where I am chief English editor) giving background on Assad’s detention and torture state, and the history of the regime’s massacres against the Syrian people, to show what’s at stake for Syrians. Please read, and share. And please pay attention to the IPM website and project. We’re planning to document and reconstruct crime scenes from Assad prisons as we have from ISIS prisons.
Quotes from the text:
“The prominent dissident Michel Kilo described meeting a young child in prison. The child’s mother had been raped in prison. Her child was born in prison nine months later. When Kilo met the boy he told him a story about a bird…”
“This was not the first time the Syrian regime had directed large scale violence against the population in the streets … It had sent the army to suppress urban uprisings in 1963, 1964, 1965, 1967, 1973, and 1980. But the 1982 Hama massacre was on a totally new scale…”
“The purpose of such abuse is not to extract information from prisoners – otherwise, why would it continue for months and years after arrest, when any information a prisoner may have had would have become obsolete. Instead it is designed to demonstrate the regime’s absolute power, and to project terror onto the society beyond the prison, to paralyze society from action.”
Anti-Campist Anger
I was on Luton’s Inspire FM trying to summarise the dramatic and blessed events in Syria. I’m really trying not to deal with the idiotic and inhumane campist propaganda that ignores the agency of the Syrian people in favour of ridiculous and ignorant grand geo-political narratives. There’s so much more important stuff going on than that chattering…. but here some was thrown at me, and I responded. Watch/ listen here.
Dawn MENA Conversation on Syria
Dawn MENA (Democracy in Exile) hosted me and Radwan Ziadeh on a Twitter Space, where we discussed the astounding advances of the suddenly revived Syrian Revolution. You can listen to it here.
To Aleppo and Beyond
An edited version of this article was published at the New Statesman.
Today, for the first time in years, millions of Syrians can dare to hope. In only three days, rebel forces swept out of the north western corner of the country in which they had been crammed, into Aleppo city and beyond.
The dominant power in the rebel coalition is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a militia which began in 2011 as an offshoot of al-Qaida, but which has since purged its most extreme elements and greatly moderated. It’s still an authoritarian Islamist organisation, but is not at all ‘like ISIS’, as some are claiming. It doesn’t field a ‘religious police’ to interfere in people’s private lives, and it has a far more tolerant approach to religious minorities and dissent than ISIS. It isn’t popular with the people it rules – at least it wasn’t until four days ago when the offensive was launched. People have protested against its authoritarianism for months. Unlike the Assad regime, HTS has largely tolerated these protests. But even if people don’t like HTS, they do support the offensive. That’s because they wish to return to their homes from which Assad and his allies expelled them.
At first the offensive looked like a limited operation, perhaps agreed between Turkey and Russia to force Assad to negotiate. But as the regime lines collapsed and the rebels entered Aleppo, pushing Iran’s militias out and liberating prisoners from Assad’s dungeons, it soon became clear that events had slipped foreign control. This is primarily a Syrian drama, reflecting both rebel success and regime failure.
The rebel coalition contains unified military forces operating much more efficiently and professionally than ever before. Even more impressive than the military improvements on show is the obvious social progress. Rebel messaging to the multicultural inhabitants of Aleppo has stressed respect for the rights and lifestyles of all religions and sects, and so far this has been backed up in practice. Unveiled women walk the streets without harassment, and services are held in the churches. There have been no credible reports of violations whatsoever. The rebels have even set up a phone line through which citizens can report violations. It is important civil revolutionaries continue to hold the rebels to the high standards they seem to have set for themselves. It was a mistake, a decade ago, to turn a blind eye to the growing criminality of the armed men, which did so much damage to the revolutionary cause.
For now, very unusually, electricity is on in the whole city. Public buildings are guarded from looters. The rebels already look something like a government, in stark contrast to the regime – a narco-mafia (look up its Captagon trade) underpinned by local warlords and foreign imperialists.
Read the rest of this entry »History Made on the Ground
You know the multiverse theory, that there are many parallel universes, and that they may contain alternate versions of ourselves and our conditions in this universe…. Well, the last couple of days feel like we’ve jumped from one existence into a parallel universe, one in which a lot more is possible. This universe is a flexible, more cheerful place, in which the Syrian Revolution may even be resolved. (As it happens, we went the day before yesterday on a trip to Edinburgh to see my son. He bought us tickets to the Museum of Illusions. We walked through an arrangement of swirling lights called The Vortex, and we lost our balance. Was that when it happened? When we got home we heard the news that Aleppo city had been liberated.)
The rebels advanced out of the narrow strip of Idlib in which they and millions of Syrians from around the country had been crammed for over four years. ‘The rebels’ here means a military alliance under the umbrella of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – the greatly moderated and better organised reincarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra. It’s still an authoritarian Islamist militia, but it’s not at all ‘like ISIS’ as the uninformed are saying. It broke definitively from the ISIS stream in 2014. It has a much more positive policy towards sectarian and ethnic minorities than ISIS. It allows far greater space for pluralism, disagreement and consultation than ISIS did (though it still arrests and detains some political opponents, and tortures them). Unlike ISIS, it doesn’t field a Hisba Diwan (or morality police) to interfere in people’s daily lives. Its focus is Syrian rather than transnational. It doesn’t threaten the west.
Its ‘Fath al-Mubeen’ military alliance also incorporates lots of members of other less authoritarian groups that were displaced to Idlib and then gobbled up by HTS. HTS has not been popular among people in Idlib – they’ve been demonstrating against it for months – but its offensive is wildly popular, because the people want to be rid of Assad and his foreign backers, and to return to their homes.
I didn’t expect the offensive, at least not on this scale. Nobody did. At first it looked to me like a controlled operation to restore the agreed Astana lines – that is, the division of north west Syria agreed upon at Astana by Russia, Iran and Turkey. Russia had pushed Turkey to normalise and negotiate with Assad, and Turkey had tried hard to do so. Assad had refused to budge from his maximalist positions, the Russians don’t want to alienate Turkey (given their difficult position attacking Ukraine), and Turkey needs more Syrian territory to which to send Syrian refugees. So perhaps the Turks and Russians were scaring Assad into negotiating by taking a few towns in the Aleppo countryside.
But the offensive went much further than that, far beyond the Astana lines. News came, meanwhile, that the Turks had prevented the Syrian National Army – comprised of former Free Army militias now under Turkish control – from moving towards eastern Aleppo. This allowed the PKK-dominated SDF to take areas in Aleppo abandoned by collapsing Assad forces – surely the opposite of what Turkey wanted. Turkey was not, therefore, in control of events. Turkey clearly didn’t know what was going on.
Read the rest of this entry »The ISIS Prisons Museum
I and Amer Matar were interviewed on the BBC media show about the ISIS Prisons Museum, of which Amer is director, and I am chief English editor. Here it is. (This can probably only be seen in the UK, I’m afraid…)
Visit the museum at https://www.isisprisons.museum/
Selective Outrage
There’s a link here to a two-part podcast of me talking about the genocide in Gaza, the genocide in Syria, and universal anti-fascism. Thanks to Andy Heintz for the opportunity.
Nursery Rhyme
| Nursery Rhyme[1] |
| How arrogant is the Englishman of whatever creed or hue who avers the Arab native is inferior to the Jew[2] |
| How Blinkened the American And all that he can see is a Disneyfied Holy Land through Judeao-Christian lunacy[3] |
| How ugly is the German with his foolish liberal pride He’s got a new set of stories but still commits genocide |
| How insane is the Israeli now that history’s put him here He builds his walls and mows his lawns in brute anger and red fear |
| How deceitful the Iranian and what a hypocrite Instead of liberating Palestine he forces Syria to submit |
| How corrupt the craven Arabs the dictators bound for hell[4] The blood of us is on their hands Our souls is what they sell |
[2] See Winston Churchill et al.
[3] Or ‘through Judeao-Christian lunettes’
[4] The author is too humble an agnostic to claim to know the actually destined destination of the dictators. ‘Hell’ here, then, as may or may not be the case there, in the afterlife, acts as a metaphor rather than a literal fact
Capital
Here is an extract from the novel I was writing before I got two jobs. The novel might be called ‘Whale’. I’ve written the first of five parts, and one day when things calm down I may be able to write the rest. The extract was published in the Critical Muslim’s Capital issue.
أساطير الآخِرين: لماذا صارت نظرياتُ المؤامرة دِيناً جديداً؟
I’m very proud to be published in Alpheratz, the new Arabic-language sister publication of the brilliant English-language New Lines. This is my essay on conspiracy theories, originally published at the Critical Muslim, adapted and translated into Arabic. Read it here.
Genocide justifying itself by genocide
The most repulsive thing I saw yesterday was a Zionist justifying the genocide of Palestinians by reference to the genocide of Syrians. Three points.
One: One genocide doesn’t make another OK. Obviously.
Two: Israel was a major reason why the US stopped serious weapons reaching the Free Army. Other than a few rhetorical comments, the US worked with Iran (doing a deal) and Russia (welcoming it into Syria to ‘solve the chemical weapons problem’, which of course it didn’t) to save Assad. This, according to what American officials told Syrians lobbying for weapons, was because Israel was worried about ‘instability’, especially about Syrians having anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons. So hundreds of thousands of Syrians were murdered, millions expelled, and the country utterly destroyed, for the sake of the apartheid state’s ‘stability’.
Three: Israel is doing exactly the same to Gaza as what Assad/Iran/Russia did to Homs, Aleppo, the Ghouta, etc: it is destroying the civilian infrastructure, imposing starvation sieges, hitting schools, hospitals, residential blocks, bakeries. Its aim is the same – to remove or annihilate the civilian population. Its genocidal rhetoric is the same, but it seems to be far more deeply spread amongst Israeli Jews than it is amongst Assad’s ‘loyal’ Alawi community. The difference in method is that Israel does the killing faster and more efficiently, with more advanced western (American and German) weapons.
So Israel does the same as Assad/Iran/Russia, only faster, and Israel contributed to the disaster in Syria anyway, and you can’t justify your fascist genocide in the south of bilad ash-sham by pointing to the fascist genocide in the north. You are all fascists, and the people of the region in their overwhelming majority despise you both. There will be no peace until both of your ideologies and murderous power systems are dismantled.
Read the rest of this entry »Syrian Gulag
I’ve written a long essay for a future issue (the Halal issue) of the Critical Muslim which reviews three necessary books on the politics of the Middle East. Two are Alex Rowell’s “We Are Your Soldiers” and Azmi Bishara’s “Syria 2011 – 2013”. Here I’m showing you a few paragraphs on the third book – Syrian Gulag: Inside Assad’s Prison System – because it’s such an essential addition to the Syrian bookshelf that I feel the need to publicise it. Nobody should pontificate about Syria before making themselves familiar with this material.
To better understand the history of the strong man, or the taghout, in Syria, let’s return to the country’s torture chambers, which became more numerous and more politically salient in the days of the UAR. Some years later, Hafez al-Assad further expanded the detention and torture network, to the point that the entire Syrian society was governed, and smothered, by the fear of detention and torture. The misrule of the supreme strong man was underpinned by hundreds of little strong men abusing people in prisons.
The US incarcerates 629 people per 100,000 of the population. This is generally considered to be the worst rate in the world. Russia incarcerates 445 per 100,000. In Syria, however, 1,200 per 100,000 are incarcerated. That’s a conservative estimate. And many of those who are taken “behind the sun”, as Syrians say, never return.
I’ve taken those figures from Syrian Gulag: Inside Assad’s Prison System by Jaber Baker and Ugur Umit Ungor. This is an immense work, based on over 100 interviews with survivors, some interviews with defected perpetrators, leaks – including the ‘Caesar’ photos of at least 6,786 people murdered in detention – as well as reports by international organizations, a vast archive of torture accounts held by a Dutch immigration lawyer, and published and unpublished prison memoirs. Prison literature (adab as-sijoon) is Syria’s most developed genre, very unfortunately.
Syrian Gulag is encyclopedic, organizing information on the different types of prisons, the various branches and their histories, and the officers who built the system. In so doing, sadly, it gives a history of the last sixty years in Syria. What’s surprising here is the petty sadism of the top-level, household-name officers, their willingness to get their hands dirty. The people in charge are thugs, quite literally. And what is wearily familiar here is the taghout’s tactic of turning meaning on its head. The “Palestine Branch” sounds like it does exciting espionage on Israel, but is in fact a torture camp for the abuse of Palestinians and Syrians.
The torture methods described are numerous and heart-shattering. They include “the German Chair”, “the Dynamo”, tying the penis, sleep deprivation, electrocution, “the Magic Carpet”, “the Ladder”, burning with charcoal, burning with hot water, fingernail extraction, drowning, “the Parachute”, “the Pyramid Pose”, cutting with knives, and rape. Remember, these horrors are not freak occurrences. Almost every Syrian family has encountered them.
Read the rest of this entry »Khaled’s Death is Hard Work
A slightly different version was published at The Markaz Review.
I remember Khaled in a beer garden in Bristol. He was sitting at a table performing the English language: “So so so,” he sang. “And and and, but and but! and so… but! so… but!” Khaled inhabiting his stocky body, his warm, brimming smile, his big head of fluffy white hair.
Of course he knew far more words than those. He somehow managed to communicate very well in English without speaking it very fluently. In Arabic he talked and talked, like the tide. Sometimes he broke into song. His writing was brilliant, the kind that will last for many generations. A poet, screenwriter, novelist — he was endlessly playful with words. And he was gentle with life, and with people. He took them very seriously.
I was with him at the BBC one evening in June 2014. ISIS had captured Mosul, and using the money looted from the city’s banks, and the American weapons captured from the fleeing Iraqi army, the organization had rapidly seized vast swathes of eastern Syria, areas which had been previously liberated from the Assad regime. The radio presenter asked Khaled what he thought of it all. His answer — “It’s important to pay attention to the role of Iran” — may have confused non-experts at the time, but was absolutely apt.
He was politically acute, although he wasn’t primarily a political person. He was a humanist, an artist, and a Syrian who cared deeply about Syrians. Once, as we toured England to introduce the Syria Speaks anthology, Khaled met refugees from villages near his own in the Aleppo countryside. “They asked me about the olive trees and the seasons,” he grinned afterwards. “I love these people.”
He liked the concrete, material detail of life, and was aware of the dense social webs connecting people. This comes through in his writing, in its sensuousness and physicality as well as in its careful intricacies of plot and character. His novels are beautiful and rewarding, but not always easy reading. The stories often proceed in narrative swirls and mosaics rather than in linear fashion. This form manifests a kind of realism, because in real human life everywhere, not only in Syria, characters are woven from stories, and stories link to further stories …
Read the rest of this entry »October the Seventh
A very slightly different version of this piece was published at The Markaz Review.
On October the seventh, Hamas fighters broke through the fence which locks Palestinians in the besieged Gaza Strip. In doing so they revealed Israel as a paper tiger. This supposed regional superpower, so skilled at containing and killing dispossessed Palestinian civilians, was unable to stop its enemies from attacking military bases and killing and abducting soldiers.
If Hamas had ended the operation there, it would have won an undoubted political as well as military victory. No doubt Israel would have responded with force, and as disproportionately as it always does, but it would have been somewhat restrained by its western allies and sponsors. The Israeli ‘peace camp’ (such as it is) might even have been revived. Even now we see Israeli fury directed at Netanyahu’s government that focused on guarding illegal settlers in the West Bank rather than the Gaza border fence. Just by breaking through the fence, Hamas changed the regional equation, showing that normalization between Israel and Arab dictators wouldn’t bring Israel security, that only a settlement with the Palestinians would do that.
But Hamas did more than break through the fence and strike military targets. It killed hundreds of civilians, including children and the elderly. A group of elderly people waiting at a bus stop were gunned down. Children were tied to their parents and set on fire. Whole families were murdered. Hamas perpetrated an appalling and enormous war crime.
This was immoral, illegal, and stupid. First, it pushed the already hyper-violent Israeli society into a blind rage for revenge. That may have been part of the calculation – to provoke a response so massive that it would upend the power structures in the region, in the hope that the new structure would turn out to be better for Palestinians. This is the kind of gamble that only a blind-faith pyromaniac could make.
Maybe the orders were, go in and cause as much damage and pain as you possibly can. Maybe they expected they would have only a few minutes to spend killing before the IDF killed them. In fact, incredibly, they had forty eight hours. I have no idea how this happened. If Israel were an Arab dictatorship, I’d say it was because key officers had been bribed or threatened to look the other way. But Israel is not an Arab dictatorship. No doubt in the years to come books will be written to attempt to explain.
In the end, Hamas achieved what has been called ‘catastrophic success’. It probably hoped to grab a few dozen hostages with which to bargain for Palestinian prisoners (or hostages) held in Israeli prisons. By taking so many hostages, and by killing so many civilians, it decreased the hostages’ value. Sections of the Israeli establishment seem to have already sacrificed the hostages. Their priority is to destroy the Palestinians, not to negotiate.
What Hamas fighters did was behave like savages. In so doing they gave Israelis and Westerners the perfect reflection of an image that already existed in their minds: the Muslim barbarian, the savage other, the irrational absolute enemy against whom all measures are justified. Because Hamas calls itself an ‘Islamic Resistance Movement’, the stain spreads to cover Muslims everywhere. (It’s worth repeating that Islamic rules of warfare very specifically forbid the harming of non-combatants.)
Irreconcilable Narratives
When I called relatives and friends living in Arab countries I realized that the story they were hearing from Arab media was very different to the story here in the west. There the focus was on Hamas’s assault on the military; here it was on Hamas’s terrorism against women and children. From the very start, the narratives spun in east and west were irreconcilable.
It didn’t help that Joe Biden said he’d personally seen and confirmed evidence of beheaded babies, and then a few hours later that the White House retracted his claim. It didn’t help that unverified claims of rape were spread far and wide. Some or all of these atrocities may actually have happened, but a lack of concern for truth on all sides has made it difficult to convince anybody of anything they don’t already believe.
Personally I don’t see any moral difference between shooting a baby in the head, or beheading a baby, or incinerating a baby with a bomb (and Israel has killed far more Palestinian children in the last few days than the total number of Israelis killed on October the Seventh). What the image of the baby-beheading rapist does, however, is to provide a justification for further genocidal violence.
The Context
Hamas’s attacks against civilians cannot be justified, but they can and must be contextualized. Israel and the West choose to believe that Hamas started the war on October Seventh. They tell us that when Hamas kills civilians it does so simply because it’s evil, and that when Israel kills civilians in greater numbers, and besieges and occupies them, it also does so simply because Hamas is evil.
Read the rest of this entry »Revolutionary Resurgence in Syria
Just a couple of points:
Twelve and a half years on, days after the tenth anniversary of the sarin slaughter in the Ghouta, that is a decade after Syrians lost all reason to hope…
As in the first years of the Syrian Revolution, people of all sects and social backgrounds are coming together to demand freedom and dignity. Over a decade of fierce sectarian counter-revolutionary violence hasn’t changed the basic demands of the Syrian people.
Protests are rising throughout southern Syria, in Daraa and Sweida provinces. As if this were 2011 reborn, there are massive popular demonstrations in regime-controlled territory. They’ve been met by solidarity demonstrations in eastern Syria: in Deir ez-Zor, and in Raqqa in PKK/PYD/SDF territory; as well as in the liberated areas of the north. The chants and lyrics of greeting and solidarity exchanged between the various regions of the country feel like a fresh breeze after the years of engineered sectarian and ethnic breakdown.
Syrians have been disappointed so many times before that it seems foolish to continue hoping. And yet, there are two new elements to the situation today. First, the entire Druze community – centred on Sweida – appears to be rejecting Assad entirely.
Individuals from minority communities have opposed Assad previously, but not a minority community en masse. The Druze of Sweida tolerated Assad so long as his forces kept their distance, and so long as young Druze conscripts served in the province rather than went to fight other Syrians. And the community sheltered defectors and others on the run from Assad’s killers. But it didn’t stage mass protests, nor an armed uprising, even as the Sunnis in neighbouring Deraa province were tortured, shot, and bombed. Assad’s main strategy has been to slaughter, rape, torture and expel Sunnis in particular, and to scare minority groups to sell them the lie that only Assad can protect them from the Sunnis. So mass protests of Druze are particularly difficult for Assad to deal with.
It looks like these protests won’t be stopped without massive violence. But massive violence against a minority sect ruins the pretext of the regime being a ‘protector of minorities’. It emphasises the unity of the Syrian people. Assad can’t survive a meeting with a unified Syrian people. Hence the slogan once again rising: One, One, One, the Syrian People are One.
Second,
Read the rest of this entry »
Qunfuz 